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RACE AND IMMIGRATION LAW:
A TROUBLING MARRIAGE
By Lisa Sandoval1

“The differences of race added greatly to
the difficulties of the situation . . . . [T]hey remained
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
and adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate
with our people, or to make any change in their habits
or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each
year the people . . . saw . . . great danger that at no
distant day that portion of our country would be
overrun by them, unless prompt action was taken to
restrict their immigration.” – Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 18892
Introduction
Immigration from Mexico should be curtailed
because it threatens the United States by eroding
Anglo-Protestant culture. This thesis is advanced in
Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity3
by Samuel Huntington, one of the most widely
cited political scientists on international relations.4
Huntington warns that Hispanic immigration to
the United States threatens to transform the nation
into “a country of two languages, two cultures, and
two peoples.”5 The current immigration debate in
the United States shows that many people support
Huntington’s proposition, as evidenced in Arizona
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070).6 Signed into law on
April 23, 2010, SB 1070 is aimed at identifying and
deporting “illegal immigrants.”7
In an attempt to facilitate this mission,
the law requires local law enforcement officials to
stop and demand identification from anyone they
“reasonably suspect” is in the country illegally.8
This of course begs the question, what gives rise to
“reasonable suspicion”? What does it mean to “look
illegal”? For that matter, what does it mean to look
42

“American”? The answers to these questions reveal
the troubling marriage between race and immigration
law. However, the underlying racism fueling SB
1070 does not represent a new trend. In fact, U.S.
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator
of non-belonging and thus reifies notions of racial
inferiority.
Ian Haney Lopez, a prominent critical race
scholar, argues that the law not only reflects but
constructs social prejudice.9 The law thus becomes
an instrument in constructing and reinforcing
racial subordination.10 In this paper, I explore how
immigration law, in particular, constructs notions
of racial inferiority by associating racial difference
with noncitizen, or “illegal”, immigration status.
Within the immigration law framework, racially
different noncitizens are pitted against a seemingly
homogenous group of “American” citizens.
As Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt point
out, citizenship has been used to refer to a whole
host of different ideas, including nationality, forms
of political participation, and entitlement to certain
rights.11 I use citizenship to refer to the entitlement to
belong. Within this definition of citizenship, belonging
encompasses both cultural and racial belonging in a
nation. I recognize that in practice citizenship does
not always grant automatic belonging in society.
Instead, I believe that citizenship is used by those
in power to determine who is worthy of belonging,
which history has revealed is a determination that
largely turns on race.
As Gordon and Lenhardt also discuss, by
defining inclusion, citizenship also defines exclusion.12
I argue that immigration law historically relied on
citizenship to exclude noncitizens, who have been
deemed unable to assimilate due to their race. In order
to gain legal status as a citizen—in order to belong—
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the noncitizen must assimilate to the citizen, who was
legally defined as white until 1952.13 Based on this
history, immigration law today continues to use racial
difference as an indicator of non-belonging, reifying
notions of racial inferiority in the process.
Kevin Johnson believes racism is visible in
immigration law because society transfers its racism
toward domestic minorities to noncitizens.14 While
overt racism toward minority citizens is much more
controversial, racism towards noncitizens can be
masked by facially neutral gripes about noncitizens’
failure to assimilate, frustration over linguistic
barriers, or intolerance of “criminals”15 who have
broken immigration laws. Johnson’s transference
theory helps explain why immigration laws continue
to justify a focus on racial difference to support race
neutral policies like protecting national security and
preserving American culture.16 The result of this kind
of immigration law and policy is what Mae M. Ngai
titles “alien citizenship.” As she explains, an “alien
citizen” is a U.S. Citizen “by virtue of her birth in the
United States but whose citizenship is suspect, if not
denied, on account of the racialized identity of her
immigrant ancestry.”17
I argue that SB 1070 provides a contemporary
example of the way immigration law constructs racial
difference as an indicator of non-belonging, reifying
notions of racial inferiority. Specifically, SB 1070
overtly attempts to exclude unwanted immigrants
and does so by mandating racial profiling. Arizona’s
new law illustrates Johnson’s theory of transference
as well as Ngai’s concept of “alien citizenship.” SB
1070 results from the evolution of this nation’s
immigration laws. Particularly important in shaping
SB 1070 is the plenary power doctrine, which currently
affords the political branches unfettered discretion
in regulating immigration. As a result of this broad
discretion, noncitizens are stripped of important
constitutional rights under federal immigration law.
SB 1070 employs a similar type of constitutional
rights-stripping.
Section One of this paper highlights four
moments in history that illustrate the way immigration
law constructs race. Section Two discusses which
constitutional protections are denied to noncitizens
in the immigration context. Section Three illustrates
how constitutional rights-stripping of noncitizens
leads to increases in racial profiling, both within and
outside of the immigration context. Section Four
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argues that SB 1070 is a product of this nation’s
historical racism towards immigrants. This section
frames SB 1070 within Johnson’s transference theory
and Ngai’s idea of alien citizenship. Finally, Section
Five provides recommendations for dismantling the
underlying racism present in immigration law.
Section One: A History of Racism in
Immigration Law
Perhaps more alarming than SB 1070’s express
sanction of racial profiling is the consistent theme
of racism present in the history of immigration law.
The evolution of U.S. immigration law demonstrates
the political and judicial branches’ repeated use of
race to deny different groups citizenship status. This
trend illustrates Gordon and Lenhardt’s theory that
citizenship defines exclusion, not merely inclusion.
While immigration law has changed over time, what
remains the same are notions of racial inferiority
associated with noncitizens. The history of U.S.
immigration law reveals many instances of race being
used to signify non-belonging, but I focus on four
moments: 1) Dred Scott v. Sandford,18 2) Chae Chan Ping
v. United States19 (the Chinese Exclusion Act case),
3) the “naturalization cases,” and 4) the Mexican
Repatriation and Operation Wetback.
Dred Scott Sets the Stage
Immigration to the United States is a
phenomenon that traces to the founding of the
nation.20 While immigration was largely unregulated
during roughly the first 100 years of the United
States’ existence, by 1882 the Chinese Exclusion Act
(“the Act”) was one of the first major attempts at
controlling the flow of people into the country.21 The
legal precedent established in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,22 a case arising from the Act, created the legal
framework for immigration law in the United States.
However, it is important to understand how Dred
Scott v. Sandford, decided thirty-three years earlier, set
the stage for Chae Chan Ping by first characterizing
citizenship in terms of racial belonging and
assimilability.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford23 the United States
Supreme Court held that African Americans, even
those born free, were not U.S. Citizens.24 The Court
denied Dred Scott the ability to sue in federal
43

court because it deemed that he was not a citizen
On May 8, 1882, Congress passed the
of the United States.25 The Supreme Court turned
Chinese Exclusion Act, which allowed the Executive
to race to determine whether the original framers
branch to exclude Chinese nationals from entering
intended to include slaves within the meaning of
the United States.30 Under the Act, Chinese nationals
already living in the United States needed to obtain
the Constitution.26 The Court presented exhaustive
evidence of racial animosity
a certificate of reentry if they
towards African Americans
left the country and wanted
in order to justify not granting
to return.31 Chae Chan Ping
whether the original framers intended
was a Chinese-born laborer
them citizenship status under
to include slaves within the meaning
living in California during the
the Constitution:
California Gold Rush, which
of the Constitution
We refer to these hislasted from approximately
torical facts for the
1848 to 1855.32 Before leaving
purpose of showing
the country to visit China, Ping obtained a certificate
the fixed opinions concerning that race,
of reentry, as required by the Act.33 However, during
upon which the statesmen of that
his absence from the country, Congress amended
day spoke and acted. It is necessary
the Act to ban reentry of Chinese, including those
to do this, in order to determine
who had obtained a certificate to do so.34 Ping was
whether the general terms used
barred from entering the country and challenged his
in the Constitution of the United
exclusion, which the Court upheld.35
States, as to the rights of man
Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court,
and the rights of the people, was
pointed
to
the Chinese laborers’ race as the underlying
intended to include them . . . .27
reason why they could not assimilate to U.S. culture:
While this case holds great meaning for many
The differences of race added
reasons beyond the scope of this paper, it is also
greatly to the difficulties of the situsignificant because the Court expressly characterized
ation. . . . [T]hey remained strangers
citizenship in terms of racial belonging. Thus, the
in the land, residing apart by themCourt focused on Scott’s racial difference as a reason
selves, and adhering to the customs
why he did not belong to the nation in the form of
and usages of their own country.
a citizen. Although this decision was later overturned
It seemed impossible for them to
by the Fourteenth Amendment,28 its characterization
assimilate with our people, or to
of noncitizens as racially different “others” set the
make any change in their habits or
jurisprudential stage for the Chinese Exclusions Act
modes of living.36
case.
The analysis then seamlessly transitioned
into the danger that the Chinese posed due to the
Chinese Exclusion and the Plenary Power Doctrine
increase in their population:
Chae Chan Ping set forth the plenary power
As they grew in numbers each year
doctrine, allowing the political branches unfettered
the people of the coast saw, or
power to regulate immigration. This discretionary
believed they saw, in the facility of
and far reaching power was justified in the name of
immigration, and in the crowded
“protecting” the nation from the danger posed by
millions of China, where population
racially different foreign nationals. The holdings of
presses upon the means of subsisthis case and the reasoning of the Court have set the
tence, great danger that at no disframework of immigration law enforcement until
tant day that portion of our country
present day. The Court’s reasoning focused on the
would be overrun by them, unless
Chinese’s racial difference as the reason why they
prompt action was taken to restrict
failed to assimilate and the threat they posed by that
their immigration. The people there
failure.29

44
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accordingly petitioned earnestly for
protective legislation.37

of the Naturalization Act of 1790 that extended
citizenship to “free white persons” and, after the
Fourteenth Amendment, “aliens of African nativity
It is clear that the Court based the racial
and . . . persons of African descent.”41 In these cases
difference of the Chinese on their inability to
courts determined whether a
assimilate, which posed a
particular group could meet the
“threat” to the people of the
prerequisite of being white in
The Court’s reasoning focused
United States. Justice Field
order to naturalize. The cases
on the Chinese’s racial difference
paints a picture of “others”
focused on race as an indicator
overtaking the nation.38 In the
as the reason why they failed to
of whether immigrants could
eyes of the Court, as well as
assimilate and the threat they
assimilate into U.S. culture,
those of Congress, the increased
which was another way of
posed by that failure.
presence of the Chinese—a
determining if they belonged
group viewed as so racially
and were thus worthy of
different that they could not blend in with their
citizenship status. The race-based requirement to
surrounding population—was something from which
naturalize was not lifted until 1952 with the passage
the people of the United States needed protection.
of the McCarran-Walter Act.42
It is through this framework of non-belonging and
It is worth noting that as a reaction to Dred
danger that the Court not only justifies, but promotes
Scott and Reconstruction efforts to rectify gross
the exclusion of the Chinese. This logic is further
inequalities, the Naturalization Act of 1790 was
evidenced when the Court declares:
amended to include “aliens of African nativity and
persons of African descent.”43 As a result of this
If…the government of the United
amendment, a black-white dichotomy of races within
States, through its legislative departthe naturalization system was created. The fact that all
ment, considers the presence of fornaturalization cases consisted of courts determining
eigners of a different race in this counwhether a particular group could be considered white
try, who will not assimilate with us, to
indicates that the black-white dichotomy was in fact
be dangerous to its peace and security,
a racial hierarchy in which whites were the dominate
their exclusion is not to be stayed
group to which noncitizens must conform. As such,
because at the time there are no
white was further constructed as the superior race to
actual hostilities with the nation of
39
which immigrants should assimilate if they were to
which the foreigners are subjects.
enjoy the full benefits of U.S. citizenship.
Chae Chan Ping built on the notion in Dred
For instance, In re Halladjian, Judge Lowell in
Scott of racial difference as creating a barrier to
the Massachusetts Circuit Court granted citizenship to
assimilation. The Court in both cases views an
four Armenians by relying on the popular usage of the
inability to assimilate due to racial difference as the
term “free white person.”44 The judge turned to late
ultimate marker of non-belonging. Going a step
eighteenth-century census documents that described
further, the Court in Chae Chan Ping characterizes
the inhabitants of the former colonies.45 Judge Lowell
the racial difference of noncitizens as a threat to
reasoned that since the censuses expressly mentioned
the nation, which justifies the political branches in
“Indians, Chinese, and Japanese,” the term white
taking whatever measures they deem appropriate in
was used as a “catch-all word to include everybody
regulating immigration.40 The result of this rationale
else.”46 While recognizing that “there is no European
is the plenary power doctrine, which ultimately leads
or white race,” Judge Lowell nonetheless allowed the
to constitutional rights-stripping of noncitizens.
notion of whiteness to continue as a prerequisite to
naturalizing. He granted the Armenians citizenship
The Naturalization Process: Determining Whiteness
based on the fact they could conceivably fall under
The “naturalization cases” refer to the
the catch all description of whiteness since their race
set of cases in which immigrants argued that they
was not explicitly mentioned in the censuses.47
should be allowed to naturalize under the provisions
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However, in Ozawa the Supreme Court
denied a Japanese man citizenship because he was
deemed as falling outside the Caucasian race and thus
could not be granted citizenship.48 The Court rejected
a color test to define whiteness and instead relied
on the meaning of Caucasian as “a zone of more or
less debatable ground outside of which, upon the one
hand, are those clearly eligible, and outside of which,
upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for
citizenship.”49 Like the Massachusetts Court, the
Supreme Court raised doubt about the concreteness
of the meaning of the term “white” or “Caucasian”
but nonetheless chose to advance the notion of
whiteness as a requisite of citizenship.50
In United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind,51 an
Indian national contested the denial of his citizenship
application. The Supreme Court held that “upper
class Hindus” could not be classified as white and
were therefore barred from naturalizing.52 The Court
conceded that trying to define whiteness through
biology or reference to Caucasian ancestry was
elusive and not scientifically sound.53 However, the
Court nonetheless connected whiteness with the
ability to assimilate by rationalizing that Europeans
were white because they could “merge into the mass
of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks
of their European origin.”54 Within this definition of
white, assimilation did not mean merely adjusting to
“American culture” but instead losing one’s identity
to blend in with the white majority.55 Hindus were
denied white status precisely because they “would
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their
ancestry.”56
Mexican Repatriation and Operation Wetback:
History Repeats Itself
During the Great Depression, President
Hoover authorized the removal of Mexican nationals,
although more than half of those removed turned out
to be U.S. Citizens.57 Due to the economic downturn,
the repatriation was intended to ensure that only
“true Americans” held jobs in the United States.58 To
assist in the round-up, all over the nation police raided
public spaces, including churches, and forced people
of Mexican ancestry onto trains and buses headed for
the U.S.-Mexico border.59 By the end of the decadelong deportation campaign, deemed “repatriation,”
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an estimated one million people of Mexican ancestry
were removed from the country.60
History repeated itself in 1954—just two
years after race requirements were removed from the
naturalization system. Congress passed Operation
Wetback, intended to deport Mexican “wetbacks,” a
term legitimately used in mainstream discourse to refer
to illegal Mexican immigrants.61 Operation Wetback
went hand-in-hand with the Bracero Program set up
by the United States to import temporary Mexican
agricultural workers in order to address labor shortages
due to World War II.62 While the United States
welcomed the labor of Mexican nationals through
the Bracero program, it simultaneously rejected the
presence of Mexican nationals beyond their capacity
as laborers. Hence, Operation Wetback was intended
to address the increase in illegal immigration that had
grown alongside the Bracero Program.63
Under the program, undocumented
Mexican nationals and Mexican nationals who were
legally present under the Bracero Program were
indistinguishable.64 Therefore, Operation Wetback’s
main mission of deporting “illegal” Mexican
immigrants served more as a cover to remove all
Mexican nationals deemed a threat to society. As
evidenced by the title of the deportation campaign,
once again racial difference fueled the exclusion
of immigrants who were deemed harmful to
society. Under Operation Wetback, more than one
million people were deported. 65 Like the Mexican
Repatriation, many deportees were U.S. citizens.66
Section Two: Extra-constitutionality of
Immigration Law
The evolution of immigration law since
Chae Chan Ping illustrates that, as a result of the
plenary power doctrine, fundamental constitutional
protections are applied in a highly restrictive manner
in the immigration context. Challenging government
action that regulates immigration is very difficult
since the plenary power doctrine also ensures that
courts provide deference to the political branches
regarding immigration laws.67 Without a check on
this unfettered discretion, the political branches are
able to abuse their power, as evidenced in federal
immigration laws that strip constitutional rights from
noncitizens and promote racial profiling.
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Noncitizens are described as not being
punished by deportation but merely regulated.68
Therefore, immigration proceedings are characterized
as civil rather than criminal.69 As a consequence,
many of the constitutional protections afforded to
criminal defendants are stripped from noncitizens
undergoing deportation proceedings. For instance,
noncitizens who undergo immigration proceedings
are not afforded many basic constitutional rights
under Article I of the Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth
Amendment. Specifically, immigration regulations
can be applied retroactively, in violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause of Article I, section 9 of the
United States Constitution.70 In addition, the Fourth
Amendment remedy for suppression of evidence
obtained in an illegal search or seizure is applied in
a very limited fashion to noncitizens.71 Noncitizens
do not enjoy a presumption of innocence72 and they
receive no Fifth Amendment protection regarding
the right to remain silent; silence can be used against
them.73 Noncitizens are also not afforded the Sixth
Amendment guarantees to an impartial jury, a speedy
trial, and right to counsel.74 Furthermore, the rules of
evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings75
and the government may use secret evidence against
noncitizens.76 The constitutional rights stripping of
noncitizens made possible by the plenary power
doctrine, makes immigration law immune from many
standard constitutional protections. As a result, police
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional is
considered legal when executed in the immigration
context. A prime example is the widespread use of
racial profiling to regulate immigration.
Section Three: Using Race to Identify
Noncitizens
Current Supreme Court precedent allows
for the use of racial profiling in immigration
enforcement.77 Amnesty International defines racial
profiling as:
[T]he targeting of individuals and
groups by law enforcement officials,
even partially, on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion,
except where there is trustworthy
information, relevant to the locality
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and timeframe, that links persons
belonging to one of the aforementioned groups to an identified criminal incident or scheme.78
Based on this definition, the legal use of
racial profiling within the immigration context
suggests that race becomes “trustworthy information”
regarding a person’s likelihood of being unlawfully
present in the country. Current immigration case law
demonstrates this correlation.
Under Brignoni-Ponce, the Court established
the legal use of racial profiling as a tool to enforce
immigration law.79 Specifically, “Mexican-appearance”
in conjunction with other articulable facts was
described as creating the reasonable suspicion
necessary to stop someone under the Fourth
Amendment. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Border Patrol had
set up a checkpoint in San Clemente, California.80
One evening, while the checkpoint was closed due
to bad weather, Border Patrol officers observed
traffic from their vehicle parked on the side of the
highway.81 They stopped respondent’s car, stating
that the respondent’s Mexican-looking appearance
was their only basis for doing so.82 Although the
Court found that Mexican appearance alone is not a
sufficient reason for stopping a person, it can be used
in conjunction with other factors.83
Brignoni-Ponce is a pivotal case because it
validated the use of racial stereotypes to define
“Mexican appearance” and connected race with the
likelihood of illegal conduct. The Court took the
government at its word that trained officers can detect
“the characteristic appearance” of people who live in
Mexico based on “such factors as the mode of dress
and haircut.”84 In no way did the Court challenge this
allegation. In fact, “mode of dress and haircut” are
merely examples of what immigration officers use to
detect someone from Mexico. Immigration officials
may be explicitly using race and accents as factors,
but the Court makes no inquiry into this. By not
challenging the government’s assertion, the Court
effectively allowed the government to decide what it
means to “look Mexican.”
The Court goes a step further by correlating
“Mexican appearance” with the likelihood of being
unlawfully present in the United States. In the
Court’s words, “[t]he likelihood that any given person
of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
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make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.”85 The
Court concluded its opinion by stating the Fourth
Amendment requires that when a person is stopped
there must be at least “reasonable suspicion” that
the person is an “alien.”86 In reaching its holding, the
Court allowed the notion of “Mexican appearance”
based on racial stereotypes to create suspicion of
illegal activity. Brignoni-Ponce remains the law and
therefore, in the context of immigration regulation,
“looking Mexican” carries a presumption of illegality.
The correlation between race and illegal
conduct has been extended to target other ethnic
groups in the context of the War on Terror. In
Farag, the Government cited Brignoni-Ponce to
allow air transportation officials to consider “Arab
appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping air
passengers because all of the 9-11 hijackers were
“Middle Eastern males.”87 Even though the Court
rejected the Government’s argument, it did reaffirm
and distinguish the use of race in Brignoni-Ponce
since that case was formally within the context of
immigration enforcement.88
Even though in Farag the Court rejected
“Arab appearance” as a relevant factor when stopping
air passengers, the government need only turn to
its official national security policy to consider race.
Federal national security policy recognizes that racial
profiling, in certain contexts, is considered legal:
In investigating or preventing
threats to national security or other
catastrophic events (including the
performance of duties related to
air transportation security), or in
enforcing laws protecting the integrity of the Nation’s borders, Federal
law enforcement officers may not
consider race or ethnicity except to the
extent permitted by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.89
Based on the precedent set forth in BrignoniPonce, it is likely that the government may target
different ethnicities in its national security efforts until
a case comes before the court forbidding specific uses
of ethnic appearance, such as “Arab appearance.”
With the increase of local officials obtaining the ability
to conduct immigration enforcement, 90 after BrignoniPonce, racial profiling will continue to be widely used
under the guise of immigration enforcement.
48

Using racial profiling as a valid immigration
enforcement tool allows racial stereotypes to gain
more social currency, both within and outside of
the immigration context. When immigration law
allows race to indicate a valid suspicion of illegal
presence, race becomes a factor that generally indicates
illegal activity. Furthermore, racial profiling of
noncitizens inevitably affects citizens of the same
race. This means that U.S. citizens who happen to
the same race as targeted noncitizens will be subject
to the same racialized standards of reasonable
suspicion. Countless examples of this reality include
the deportation of U.S. citizens based on “looking
illegal.”91 Additionally, racial profiling techniques
used by local law enforcement officials under 287(g)
are likely to bleed over into standard law enforcement
efforts.
Section Four: SB 1070
SB 1070 explicitly states that the policy
behind the law is “attrition through enforcement,”92
or exclusion of “unlawful aliens” by making their
lives so difficult that they voluntarily choose to leave
the country rather than being subject to deportation.93
As the law’s author, Arizona Senator Russell Pearce,
states “Arizona has made it clear through our policies
that illegal immigrants are not welcome, and they are
self-deporting from the state.”94 SB 1070 creates new
immigration crimes and mandates that law enforcement
officials determine the immigration status of a
person when “reasonable suspicion” exists that she
is “an alien who is unlawfully present in the United
States.”95 In fact, the law allows Arizona citizens to
sue officials or agencies they believe are not enforcing
immigration law to the full extent permissible under
federal law.96
In many ways SB 1070 is the modern
incarnation of Chae Chan Ping because it explicitly
attempts to exclude an immigrant community based
on the alleged threat that that community poses to
U.S. citizens. In the process of excluding, SB 1070,
like Chae Chan Ping, reifies notions of racial inferiority
by using race as an indicator of non-belonging. In
Chae Chan Ping, race was a barrier to assimilation
and thus justified excluding the Chinese. Under SB
1070, racial profiling is used to identify potential
“illegal immigrants” who “are not welcome” in
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Arizona. As a result, many critics have referred to
SB 1070 as the “breathing while brown” law.97 The
mandated determination of immigration status
based on “reasonable suspicion” is akin to mandated
racial profiling of mainly Hispanic immigrants. This
reality is confirmed by Arizona’s failure to articulate
on what grounds other than race law enforcement
officials will base their reasonable suspicion that a
person is unlawfully present. Arizona Congressmen
have fumbled as they describe factors other than
race that create reasonable suspicion of unlawful
presence: attire, accents, grooming, and shoes.98 It
appears that SB 1070 attempts to codify Brignoni-Ponce
and mandate that “Mexican appearance” be used in
enforcing immigration—despite politicians claiming
that race will not serve as a factor.
However disturbing the law’s explicit focus
on race, what is more problematic is that the current
legal battle over the law is focused on notions of
preemption: whether Arizona’s law conflicts with
federal immigration enforcement. While other legal
arguments regarding equal protection have been
advanced to overturn SB 1070,99 preemption remains
the strongest threat to the law. This suggests that the
true legal battle is over who gets to do the excluding
and racial profiling: the federal government or the
states? Recognizing that federal immigration law is
nearly if not equally as troubling as SB 1070, I focus
on the Arizona law given its explicit representation of
Johnson’s notion of transference and Ngai’s theory of
alien citizenship. In light of this, the popular support
SB 1070 has received across the nation suggests that
immigration law continues to be a powerful vehicle
of racial subordination.
Criminalizing Immigrants as Transference
SB 1070 creates new immigration crimes,
further criminalizing the immigrant community.
Kevin Johnson advances the theory of transference,
which occurs when society transfers its racism
towards minority citizens to noncitizens.100 As
Johnson explains, “immigration status, combined
with race, ma[kes] such treatment more socially
acceptable and legally defensible.”101 Johnson traces
transference, as it applies in the immigration context,
to the psychological theory that feelings toward one
group of people are refocused on another.102 As a
result of transference, Johnson believes that a society’s
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treatment of noncitizens of color reveals its feelings
toward citizens of color.103 Thus, Johnson describes
differential treatment of citizens and noncitizens as a
“magic mirror” that reveals “how dominant society
might treat domestic minorities if legal constraints
were abrogated.”104 Not only does Johnson’s theory
help explain why immigration law has historically
treated noncitizens as racially inferior, it also explains
how immigration law implicates all citizens of color
regardless of citizenship—even though citizenship
continues to serve as a tool to exclude noncitizens
on the basis of race. SB 1070 is, therefore, a grave
warning sign for all citizens of color in Arizona.
Unlike federal law, SB 1070 makes it a state
crime for an “unauthorized alien” to apply for a job
or to solicit work publically.105 The latter crime would
affect mainly Mexican day laborers who congregate
in certain areas of town where people come to
solicit work.106 A related crime includes knowingly
transporting a person who is unlawfully present
in the country.107 Many of these new crimes come
with mandatory jail times.108 Additionally, SB 1070
makes not carrying immigration papers a crime.109 In
order to enforce these new criminal laws, SB 1070
allows law enforcement officials to ask for proof of
citizenship during a “legal stop, detention, or arrest,”
which can include questioning people who are victims
of crimes themselves or stopped for offenses like
traffic violations or loitering.110 If a lawfully present
noncitizen111 is stopped and does not have proper
immigration papers, he or she will be subject to arrest
and a fee of $500 for a first time violation.112 The
penalties associated with not carrying one’s papers
makes life difficult for all noncitizens, suggesting that
all immigrants in Arizona are unwelcome—not just
those who are undocumented.
In 2006, Hispanics accounted for 29.1%
of Arizona’s total population.113 This figure is
approximately twice as high as the Hispanic population
in the rest of the United States, which was 14.8% the
same year.114 The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that
in 2006, 6.9% to 7.7% of the State’s total population
was undocumented.115 These figures suggest that the
percentage of undocumented people in Arizona as of
2006 was not overwhelmingly large. However, these
figures also suggest that the increase in Hispanics in
Arizona was substantial. Applying Johnson’s theory
of transference, it appears that Arizona’s perception
of being “invaded” by “illegals”116 indicates an
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underlying fear of a general increase in the Hispanic
population as a whole. In fact, the Pew Hispanic
Center found that while the native- and foreign-born
Hispanic population grew substantially from 2000
to 2006, so did the non-Hispanic population.117 On
a percentage basis, “Hispanics have contributed no
more to population growth in Arizona than they have
to the growth of the U.S. population.”118
If the Hispanic population grew at a similar
rate as the non-Hispanic population, Johnson’s
transference theory indicates that Arizona’s fear of
“illegal immigration” is based on the fear of a general
increase of the Hispanic population, despite the fact
that in 2006, the figure of undocumented people was
at most 7.7%. In other words, Arizona’s “crackdown”
on the “invasion” of Hispanic “illegals” is not only
inaccurate, but indicates that fear of an increase in
the Hispanic population has translated into a fear of
an increase in noncitizens. As Johnson points out, it
is much more socially acceptable to target noncitizens
of color than it is to target citizens of color.119 As
a result, Arizona’s “crackdown” maintains popular
support in the state because society has equated
Hispanics with illegal immigration.
Due to an increase in the Hispanic population,
even though this increase did not outmatch the
growth of the non-Hispanic population, Arizona
has transferred its general fear of Hispanics to
noncitizens by over criminalizing immigrants. Samuel
Huntington’s disapproval of Hispanic immigration is
mirrored in SB 1070. This fear and racial animosity
results in the nation’s toughest immigration law.
Reasonable Suspicion as Mandated Racial Profiling:
Recreating the Mexican “Illegal Alien”
Particularly troubling is SB 1070’s mandate to
determine immigration status based on “reasonable
suspicion” that a person is unlawfully present in the
United States.120 This mandate leads to increased
racial profiling. As federal law demonstrates, using
Mexican appearance as a factor in determining
immigration status is lawful.121 However, federal law
indicates that using race may be permitted, whereas
SB 1070’s requirement that immigration law must be
enforced “to the full extent that federal law permits”
suggests that race must be used as a factor. SB 1070
states that race must not be the “sole” factor in
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determining immigration status, suggesting that it is
indeed a central factor.122
This increased racial profiling highlights
what Mae M. Ngai describes as alien citizenship. Ngai
describes the alien citizen as “an American citizen by
virtue of her birth in the United States but whose
citizenship is suspect, if not denied on account of
the racialized identity of her immigrant ancestry.”123
Ngai argues that non-white groups are deemed
immutable, “making [their] nationality a kind of
racial trait.”124 As a result, non-white groups obtain a
permanent foreignness that leads to a nullification of
U.S. citizenship.125 SB 1070’s mandated racial profiling
creates a similar type of permanent foreignness as
Hispanics, regardless of citizenship status, become
susceptible to being stopped and asked to prove their
legal status by producing their papers. No limit exists
on the amount of times a person may be stopped,
leading to the possibility that one must constantly
prove his belonging. As a result, Hispanics carry a
strong presumption of foreignness under SB 1070.
As Ngai states, “[r]acism thus creates a problem of
misrecognition for the citizen of . . . Latino descent
. . . .”126
To be clear, Ngai believes that alien
citizenship is a form of rights nullification that has
existed throughout history, specifically exemplified
by the territorial removal of one million Mexicans
during the Great Depression (more than half of
whom were U.S. Citizens) and the internment of
120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II
(two-thirds of whom were U.S. Citizens).127 Ngai
traces the creation of Mexican “illegal alien” to the
Jim Crow segregation of Mexicans in the southwest
who were stripped of belonging.128 I argue that SB
1070 serves as the rebirth of the Mexican “illegal
alien.”
Public Reaction to SB 1070
If immigration law is a “helpful gauge for
measuring this nation’s racial sensibilities”129 as Kevin
Johnson suggests, what does the nation’s reaction to
SB 1070 indicate? A survey conducted on October
31, 2010 revealed that fifty percent of Arizona voters
believe that SB 1070 has positively affected the state’s
image (this figure is up from forty-one percent in May
of 2010).130 The same survey also revealed that sixtyone percent of the state’s voters still favor the new
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immigration law.131 In fact, Governor Jan Brewer,
who signed SB 1070 into law, easily won reelection in
the 2010 mid-term elections.132
On a national level, civil rights groups have
certainly voiced strong disapproval of SB 1070.133
Litigation intended to overturn the law has also been
somewhat successful.134 However, since SB 1070
was signed into law on April 23, 2010, twenty-two
states have introduced legislation modeled on the
new law.135 These “copycat” laws suggest support
for SB 1070 by much of the country. In fact, during
the 2010 mid-term elections, SB 1070 served as a
major platform issue to gain political support. As
Politico reported, in order to win votes, Republican
candidates had to explicitly state their support for the
law.136 Furthermore, the day after the injunction on
the law, “59 percent of American voters wanted an
Arizona-style law in their state, while only 32 percent
did not.”137 States with high Hispanic populations
show support for an Arizona-style law above the
national average. For instance, sixty-two percent of
Texas voters favor a law similar to Arizona’s and sixty
percent of Colorado voters agree.138
The plenary power doctrine set forth in Chae
Chan Ping has led to federal immigration law that strips
noncitizens of crucial constitutional protections.
This reality has set the stage for state laws like SB
1070 that represent states’ frustration with federal
enforcement. Johnson’s notion of transference
is evidenced when states like Arizona with large
Hispanic populations develop animosity towards their
immigrant populations and show frustration over the
federal government not taking full advantage of the
plenary power it has over immigration enforcement.
While SB 1070 represents the modern incarnation of
Chae Chan Ping, the history of U.S. immigration law
suggests that Arizona’s attempts at exclusion based
on racial difference should come as no surprise.
The type of alien citizenship that exists for many in
Arizona is likely to spread as national support for SB
1070 remains strong and states continue to introduce
copycat laws.
Section Five: Recommendations
I recognize that the thesis driving
the arguments in my paper is unpleasant: U.S.
immigration law uses racial difference as an indicator
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of non-belonging and thus reifies notions of racial
inferiority. However, this truth is undeniable in light
of the evolution of immigration law from Chae
Chan Ping to SB 1070. Historically, immigration
regulation in the United States has explicitly relied
on race and notions of racial inferiority to deny
people citizenship status. Under current immigration
law, Supreme Court precedent allows for “Mexican
appearance” to serve as a factor in determining a
person’s immigration status. Most recently, national
support for SB 1070, a law that in practice mandates
racial profiling, represents the nation’s support for
excluding racially different noncitizens. In the United
States, it is far too easy to exercise racism under the
guise of immigration enforcement.
This grim reality can only be altered by
public education efforts that bring to light this
nation’s historic and contemporary racist treatment
of immigrants. Additionally, civil rights and
immigrants’ rights organizations must argue that
racial discrimination in the immigration context
deserves strict scrutiny—the plenary power doctrine
should not trump the Supreme Court’s practice of
applying strict scrutiny whenever fundamental rights
are implicated.
Public Education
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inspiring words are
used by immigrants’ rights advocates across the nation,
“Remember, remember always that all of us, and you
and I especially, are descended from immigrants and
revolutionists.”139 However, racist immigration laws
and policies throughout our nation’s history reveal
that society has not been quick to remember that all
U.S. citizens are “descended from immigrants.” If
people have reflected on their immigrant past, then
they are quick to forget since it is difficult to detect
empathy and tolerance in our nation’s immigration
laws. In fact, the Senate recently blocked the DREAM
Act, a bill intended to put undocumented immigrant
students on a path to citizenship.140
I am someone who has dedicated the past
seven years to learning about immigration to the
United States, as well as global migration patterns.
Only until I entered law school did I learn of
the problematic use of race within this nations’
immigration jurisprudence. It appears that our
nation’s racist treatment of immigrants is a secret
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history to which most U.S. citizens have not been
exposed. In fact, one of the most famous symbols of
our country is the melting pot, which many people
believe represents the idea that all people, regardless
of race, religion, or culture, achieve harmony within
the United States. However, the “melting pot,” is a
metaphor that describes the process of assimilation
in order to achieve homogeneity in society.141 The play
by Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot,142 popularized the
term. As our nation’s naturalization laws until 1952
show, that “melting pot” never included people of
color since being American also meant being white.
Education textbooks must include more
information about moments like the Mexican
Repatriation, Operation Wetback, and other shameful
moments in immigration history. A 2006 survey of
nine American history textbooks found that only
one dedicated more than half a page to the Mexican
Repatriation.143 In fact, as future generations learn
of the 9-11 terrorist attacks through textbooks, they
should also learn about the rise in hate crimes against
Muslim Americans and the deportation of 315,000
“alien absconders” selectively applied to Muslims,
Arabs and South Asians shortly after 9-11.144 However,
before parents can promote exposing their children
to immigration history in the United States, they
too must learn of this secret past. Only by exposing
the general public to this nation’s historic treatment
of immigrants will people begin to see through the
illusion of race-neutral immigration laws.
Breaking Myths and Humanizing the Immigrant
Experience
In order to dismantle fear campaigns created
around the alleged threats that immigrants pose,
additional public education campaigns are needed to
break the myths that permeate the public’s perception
of immigration.145 While doing so, these campaigns
should humanize the immigrant experience by
revealing statistics regarding mixed status families.
For instance, MALDEF’s Truth in Immigration
campaign should serve as a model campaign for other
organizations. Through this campaign, MALDEF
rebuts statistical and legal inaccuracies regarding
immigration.146 For instance, many people criticize
undocumented immigrants as making a choice to
enter the country illegally in violation of this nation’s
laws. However, MALDEF counters that notion by
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pointing out that more than 2 million immigrants
come to this country as minor children.147 On a
related note, mixed status families exist throughout
the United States, making it difficult to draw lines
based on citizenship that dictate who belongs and
who does not.148 These realities must become public
knowledge in order to combat fear campaigns that
dehumanize immigrants.
Litigation
Under current constitutional law, every time
a fundamental right is implicated, a law must pass
strict scrutiny.149 This standard requires that a law
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest.150
However, all immigration statutes, due to the
plenary power afforded the federal government in
regulating immigration, receive judicial deference.151
Furthermore, the standard set forth in Fiallo states
that even when fundamental rights that normally
receive strict scrutiny, such as marriage, are at issue
in the immigration context, deferential treatment
still applies.152 However, Justice Marshall’s dissent,
joined by Justice Brennan, should give civil rights
attorneys a stepping stone to make legal arguments
that immigration statutes should not always receive
deferential treatment. Justice Marshall states:
[T]he Court appears to hold that
discrimination among citizens, however invidious and irrational, must
be tolerated if it occurs in the context of the immigration laws. Since
I cannot agree that Congress has
license to deny fundamental rights
to citizens according to the most
disfavored criteria simply because
the Immigration and Nationality
Act is involved, I dissent.153
While Justice Marshall limits his criticism
to discrimination in the immigration context that
affects citizens, his dissent does promote the idea
that immigration statutes should not always receive
deferential treatment when fundamental rights are
implicated. Cases brought by U.S. citizens who have
been wrongfully deported could advance Justice
Marshall’s stance. This argument can eventually be
expanded to noncitizens by civil rights attorneys
advocating the position that when fundamental
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rights, such as being free from racial discrimination,
are implicated, the Supreme Court should never
apply deferential review, regardless of the plaintiff ’s
citizenship status.
A particularly compelling argument to
incorporate is that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not restrict equal protection and due process to
citizens since “[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”154 The
notion that people present in the United States are
entitled to equal protection regardless of citizenship
status was supported in Plyer v. Doe.155 New legal
arguments that attempt to extend the Court’s rationale
in Plyer v. Doe must be advanced.
While the government may argue that national
security is a compelling interest that allows for its
unfettered discretion in regulating immigration, civil
rights groups should argue that the Supreme Court
must take a more nuanced approach to immigration
and not treat it solely within the context of the War
on Terror. Additionally, civil rights groups must also
argue that using racial profiling is not a narrowly
tailored means of achieving compelling interests
related to national security.
Achieving more than deferential review of
immigration statutes that discriminate, or lead to
discrimination, is surely an uphill battle, but these
legal arguments must be made. Perhaps justices will
continue to dissent and provide even more fodder to
civil rights attorneys making new legal arguments for
stricter review of immigration statutes.
Conclusion
SB 1070 exemplifies immigration laws’
reliance on race as an indicator of non-belonging.
In the process, notions of racial inferiority abound
as Hispanics become indistinguishable from
“unwelcome illegal immigrants.” SB 1070’s mandate
to identify noncitizens who do not belong is executed
through racial profiling. Johnson would likely agree
that Arizonans who support the law and recently
reelected the governor who signed SB 1070 into
law have transferred their racial animosity towards
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Hispanics to noncitizens. Ngai would likely agree
that the consequences of this transference results
in a state of alien citizenship for Hispanics whose
citizenship has been made suspect by the law.
SB 1070 results from a long history of racist
immigration law and policy in the United States. In
particular, the plenary power doctrine developed in
Chae Chan Ping has facilitated the creation of laws
like SB 1070 that claim to merely mirror federal
immigration law, which deprives noncitizens of
vital constitutional protections. The central debate
surrounding SB 1070 has become, who gets to do the
excluding of noncitizens: the states or the federal
government?
The only way racism can become divorced
from immigration law is to expose the general public
to this nation’s history of racism towards immigrants.
Humanizing the immigrant experience is also
important in order to question the idea that citizenship
is the ultimate marker of belonging. Furthermore,
society must look into Johnson’s “magic mirror”
and realize that its treatment of immigrants of color
reflects how it views citizens of color. On the legal
front, civil rights and immigrants’ rights organizations
must continue to fight the hard battle of gaining
more than deferential review of immigration statutes.
Only when these goals are accomplished will laws like
SB 1070 lose public support.
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